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The hypothesis of market power in the Norwegian primary aluminium industry is tested using plant-level
panel data. Economies of scale are found to be present, and Norwegian aluminium plants charge a
procyclical price-cost margin that significantly exceeds zero. Consequently, the simple competitive
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1.	 Introduction
This paper uses plant-level panel data to test for the existence of market power in the
Norwegian primary aluminium industry. Market power, defined as a positive price-cost
margin; may be due to oligopolistic behaviour, product differentiation or economies of
scale.
According to Rønning et al. (1986), the international aluminium industry was dominated
by a few large companies during the first post-war decades. In this oligopoly setting, the
price was set to cover costs plus a margin, that is a producer price-based system, and
stock adjustments were used to meet demand cycles. The price was kept relatively low
during periods of excess demand, at least in the 1950s, to attract new consumers, cf.
Rosenbaum (1989). Concentration has declined over time, however. While the six
dominant companies, Alcan (Canada), Alcoa (USA), Alusuisse (Switzerland), Kaiser
(USA), Pechiney (France) and Reynolds (USA), accounted for 86 per cent of world
capacity in 1955, they accounted for 73 per cent in 1971, 62 per cent in 1979, and 40
per cent in 1993. i Fringe plants had a significant impact on price determination as early
as the mid-seventies, and the industry changed to be more competitive and less
oligopolistic, cf. Reynolds (1986, p. 231). Primary aluminium has been traded at the
London Metal Exchange (LME) since 1978 and at the Commodity Exchange in New
York (COMEX) since 1981. And today, the price development at LME and COMEX
is of major importance to most trade in aluminium.
Physically, aluminium ingot is a homogeneous good at a given grade of purity. A
comparison of the price per tonne aluminium obtained by Norwegian aluminium plants
and the spot market price registered at LME of 99.7 per cent ingot aluminium reveals
important price variation, however. These price differences may reflect (see also Mette
(1990)):
(i) Vertical (quality) differentiation, that is, variation in the purity of aluminium
offered from different plants;
(ii) Horizontal differentiation, for example due to semi-manufactures, customer
tailored products, and variation in customer service and reliability of delivery
across plants.
Sources: Bresnahan and Suslow (1989, p. 280) and information provided by Hydro
Aluminium, Oslo.
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(iii) Vertical integration between producers and buyers of primary aluminium and
semi-manufactures,
(iv) The extensive use of long-term contracts made by Norwegian aluminium plants
at different points in time and with different price agreements.
Although all these factors may be present, their relative importance is unknown. While
(i) and (ii) imply that Norwegian aluminium prices may permanently differ from the spot
market prices, (iv) implies that Norwegian aluminium prices should equal the spot
market price in the long-run. They may lag behind though. The effect of (iii) depends
on the companies' internal pricing strategies.
The flexible translog cost function approach, suggested by Christensen et al. (1971,
1973), is used to estimate the variable cost functions of Norwegian aluminium plants.
Support is found for increasing returns to scale with respect to variable inputs, and the
paper concludes that Norwegian aluminium plants charge a procyclical price-cost margin
that significantly exceeds zero. Consequently, the simple competitive hypothesis is
rejected. Heterogeneity in both prices and marginal costs gives rise to intra-industry
variation in the margins.
Regressions of Norwegian prices on the spot market price are run, and long-run price
homogeneity is supported by the data. The interpretation of this is that the observed
price differences are, to a large degree, explained by the use of long-term contracts.
However, the hypothesis of differentiated products is not rejected, since several plants
are found to charge a price permanently above the spot market price. A decline in
industry concentration internationally, which is assumed to increase the degree of
competition, has no significant effect on the price-cost margins of Norwegian plants
during the seventies and eighties.
Section two discusses the theoretical framework, while section three and four present the
estimated variable cost function and the price-cost margins respectively. The main
findings are summarized in the final section.
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2.	 The theoretical framework
This section presents the differentiated products and the homogeneous goods oligopoly
model with competition in quantities.' The Norwegian primary aluminium industry is
dominated by two companies, Hydro Aluminium and Elkem aluminium. We assume,
however, that variable input decisions are taken at the plant level, and that each plant
maximizes own profits. Capacity expansions and output decisions, which are more likely
to be taken at the concern level, are not included in this analysis.
If aluminium plants produce differentiated products, i.e. products that are imperfect
substitutes, the prices may vary across plants. We assume that plants produce either a
single product or a stable product mix over time, so that output of each plant may be
treated as a single product. Each plant is assumed to face a downward-sloping demand
curve, which depends on own-price, the price of other aluminium products, the prices
of substitutes for aluminium and the level of activity in the end-use industries of
aluminium. Equation (2.1) defmes world demand for plant f's  product. The inverse
demand equation on reduced form is given in (2.1').
(2.1) Xf = Jf(Pf, P4, P. , No	 f=1,..,m
(2.1') Pf = Pf(Xf,	 P*, M)	 f=1,..,m
where Xf is world demand for aluminium from plant f; Pf is the price of plant f's
product; P_F(P i ,..,PP41 ,..,P.), is a vector of the prices of all other primary aluminium
products; X4=(X 1 ,..,Xf_ i ,Xf+1 ,..,Xm), is a vector of output in other plants; P* is the price
of substitutes for aluminium; and M is output in the end-use industries of aluminium.
The downward-sloping demand curves assumption implies that axiapf < O, and if own-
price derivatives dominate cross-price derivatives, then apiaxf < a, f=1,..,m. If, in
addition, axial); > 0, see Friedman (1983, p. 52) for this definition of differentiated
products, then apiax; < 0, f,j=1,..,m.
Equations (2.2) and (2.3) defme the variable cost function and the first-order profit
maximization condition of plant f, which is consistent with competition in quantities. At
the optimum, marginal cost equals (perceived) marginal revenue.
(2.2) Cf = Cf(Qf, Xf, l(f)
	
f=1,..,m
2
 The conclusions in section 3 are independent of the assumption that quantity rather than
price is the paramount decision variable for our sample.
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(2.3) Pf [ 1 Ef
	 fifi • 0 = acfcyaxf 	 =1,..,m
where Cf is variable costs of plant f; Qf
 is a vector with variable input prices faced by
plant f; Kf is the capital stock in plant f; ef = -[apoxf] pcfrpf] 0 is the inverse own-
price elasticity of demand faced by plant f; = 4aPflaXi]- [Xj/Pf] 0 is the inverse
cross-price elasticity of demand between product f and j; 0 14 = [aXi/3Xf]- [Xf/Xj] 5. 0
is plant f's conjectural variation elasticity with respect to plant j. This measures the
competitive reaction of plant j to plant f's output decision, as perceived by plant f. In
a differentiated products oligopoly with strategic interdependence between plants, we
assume that each plant's profit is a decreasing function of other plants' quantities.
Hence, the conjectural variation elasticities are negative, cf. Tirole (1989, p. 218). If
there are no strategic interdependence between plants, the conjectural variation
elasticities are zero, and the industry is characterized by monopolistic competition.
If aluminium plants produce homogeneous goods, we assume all plants to face the same
demand curve; P 1 =..= Pf =..= Pm E-- P and awax; apiax, where X = IfXf, f=1,..,m.
This provides a basis for testing the relevance of the homogeneous goods hypothesis
within the differentiated products model. By taking these restrictions into account, world
demand for primary aluminium can be defined as in (2.4), and the plant's first-order
condition collapses to (2.5), cf. appendix 2.3
(2.4) X = J(P, P*, M)
(2.5) P [1 - e-	 = acfoiaxf 	 =1,..,m
where X is total demand for primary aluminium; P is the price of primary aluminium;
E = -[ap/ax] pcipi 0 is the inverse demand elasticity; 07 = [axiaxf] pcfai
is plant f's conjectural variation elasticity with respect to total supply, which includes
f's own output. If the market is characterized by Cournot oligopoly, no strategic
interdependence is present, and axiaxf = 1. Hence, elf = Sf, where Sf = Xf/X is the
market share of plant f. If the market is competitive so that 97 = 0, we expect price to
equal marginal cost, unless economies of scale are present.
The degree of market power exerted by plant f is measured by the price-cost margin,
that is, the Lerner index (Lerner (1934)):
= - acfoiaxo I Pf.
3 The homogeneous goods model is discussed in Appelbaum (1979, 1982).
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Standard assumptions imply that [Pf - acfo/axf] o and acfoiaxf 0, and hence
0 5_ gf 5_ 1. When price equals marginal cost and gf = 0, plant f has no market power.
The larger is gf, the larger is the market power.
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are the market power indices in the differentiated products
model (D) and the homogeneous goods model (H) respectively.
(2.6) gP =
 Cf
 + 1,i*ffitj• 01):,
(2.7)
	 = E. op
f=1,..m
f=1,..m
Equations (2.6) and (2.7) demonstrate that a plant's market power is determined by the
elasticities of demand and the competitive reactions of other plants. Market power is a
decreasing function of own-price elasticity and competitors' reactions in both the
differentiated products and the homogeneous goods oligopoly. The less price-sensitive
is demand with respect to own-price, that is, the larger is the inverse own-price
elasticity, the greater is market power. And, since we assume that the quantity reaction
of other plants to plant f's decision is negative, in which case ep < 0 and 911 < 1, such
reactions reduce market power. In the differentiated products case, the magnitude of the
cross-price elasticities, the N's, determine the effect of the competitive reactions of
other plants on the market power of plant f.
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3.	 The cost function
Alternative approaches have been applied to test for the existence and sources of market
power.' This paper obtains a measure of the degree of market power from data on price
and estimated variable cost equations, and tests the theoretical predictions of the models
in section 2 using the calculated price-cost margins. This direct approach, which is an
alternative to estimating all equations determining demand and supply, simplifies the
analysis. This is particularly true if the market is a differentiated products oligopoly. 5
The drawback of the direct approach is that it reduces the possibility of making
inference about the relative importance of alternative sources of market power.
We model variable costs using the flexible translog function suggested by Christensen
et al. (1971, 1973), which can be interpreted as a quadratic approximation to a general
continuous twice-differentiable function. Labour (L), raw materials (M) and electricity
(E) are assumed to be variable inputs, while capital is treated as a quasi-fixed, or
predetermined, factor. Plant-specific dummy variables and a trend variable are included.
Hence, the general cost function captures permanent differences in technology or
efficiency across plants (fixed effects) as well as technical innovation over time. In their
analysis of the aluminium industry in North America, Bresnahan and Suslow (1989)
conclude that the industry short-mn marginal cost curve is right angled at the capacity
constraint. To capture that the marginal cost curve may be particularly steep close to the
capacity constraint, we include output multiplied with a dummy variable that is one in
periods with a very high capacity utilization ratio and zero elsewhere.
(3.1) 1nCft = yof + ocif lnQift + 1/2	 lnQift ingift + Tx haft + 1/2 yxx (MO'
+ lix lnQift
 lnXft
 + IK lnKft + 1/2 yKK (lnKft)2 + Ei yiK lnQift lnKft
	y x-K
 lnXft lnKft + IT 1nTt + 1/2 yrT (lnT)2 +	 lnQift 1nTt
	
+ yxr lnXft 1nTt + Trr
 lnKft 1nTt + ycAp DUM 	+ uift lnQift + uft
i,j=L, M, E, f=1,..,m
4 For surveys of this field, see Geroski (1988) and Bresnahan (1989). See also Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991) and Chirinko and Fazzari (1994).
5 An attempt was made to estimate the reduced form price equations. No effects of variations
in output of Norwegian plants on their own price or the spot market price of primary aluminium
were found. This supports the hypothesis of no market power, cf. Bresnahan (1989, p. 1048-49),
and may suggest that Norwegian plants behave as followers and price takers, or that the
international aluminium market was relatively competitive over the seventies and eighties. The
"high degree of competition" hypothesis is supported by Froeb and Geweke (1987), who find
that "the structure and performance in the U.S. aluminum industry in the postwar period conform
well with the hypothesis that the primary aluminum market was competitive in the long run".
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where subscript t denotes period t. Cf
 is total variable costs of plant f, that is, Cf =
QieVif; Qif is the price of input i faced by plant f; Vif is the quantity of input i in plant
f; Xf
 is the output of plant f measured in tonnes aluminium; Kf is the output capacity
of plant f measured in tonnes aluminium; DUMf is a dummy variable that is one in
periods-where the capacity utilization ratio is 0.97 or above and zero elsewhere; uif and
Uf are stochastic error terms with mean zero and no autocorrelation over time or across
plants; The a's, P's and T's are coefficients. The time trend, T, is assumed to proxy the
level of technology. The capital measure, Kf, can be interpreted as an efficiency-
corrected capital measure, cf. Sato (1975, pp. 6-7). This implies that the coefficient yu,
which is assumed to capture changes in capital efficiency over time, should equal zero.
We assume that plants are price-takers in variable input markets. Applying Shepard's
Lemma to (3.1) gives the cost-share equation for each variable input, and the cost-share
equation for input i includes the error term uif. In Lindquist (1993), a multivariate error-
correction model of the cost shares of labour and raw materials was estimated by full
information maximum likelihood (FIML). That paper uses a panel of seven Norwegian
plants in the primary aluminium industry for the period 1972-1990 and one plant that
closed in 1981.6 The regressions started in 1974 because of the dynamic specification.
Because the cost shares must sum to unity by definition, the cost-share equation for
electricity is obtained by using the adding up condition and the estimated cost share
equations for the other variable inputs.
The estimated long-run coefficients in the cost-share equations from Lindquist (1993),
that is aif, j3ii, lix' yiK and 'YT'  used as a priori restrictions when estimating the
static cost function in equation (3.1).7 This two step procedure applied when estimating
the cost function implies that the "equilibrium errors" (uift) from the first step, i.e. the
estimation of the cost share equations, should be taken into account in the second step
when the remaining coefficients in the cost function are estimated. 8 Estimating the
6 We use primarily data from the manufacturing statistics data base at Statistics Norway. The
manufacturing statistics employ the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and
give annual data for plants classified at the 5-digit level of the ISIC. For a detailed presentation
of the data see Lindquist (1993).
7 All variables except the cost shares were normalized to one in 1972 when
estimating the cost-share equations. This was necessary to obtain convergence of the
general dynamic model. This normalization implies that the aif's could be set equal to
the plant specific cost shares in 1972.
8 The equilibrium errors (u ift) are not equal to the residuals of the dynamic cost-share
equations, that is the multivariate error-correction model. We calculate the equilibrium errors as
the actual cost shares minus predicted cost-shares on the basis of the static or long-run
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general cost function with all these restrictions and the uift's as predetermined variables
give a standard error of regression of 20 per cent. If we replace the equilibrium errors
by constant coefficients to be estimated, that is l if=uift, the standard error decreases to
7 per cent. This increases the number of independent coefficients to be estimated by 16
and adds flexibility to the cost function. The adding up condition requires that EiThf=0.
This approach is equivalent to estimate the aif's without restrictions from step one but
given the condition that yiaif=1. Both Akaike's information criterion, the dominance
ordering criterion and the likelihood dominance ordering criterion, cf. Akaike (1974) and
Pollack and Wales (1991), prefer the more flexible cost function to that with the
predetermined equilibrium errors included.
The key findings of Lindquist (1993) are: The conditional cost-share equations are
homogeneous of degree zero in input prices ( =0), and the cross-price effects are
symmetric ( 3ii=f3ii). The hypothesis of Hicks-neutral technical progress is accepted
(7iT=0), as is the hypothesis that the production technology is homothetic (T=O). The
input coefficient for electricity is independent of the level of capacity (YEK=0; 'Au('
yuc). In addition, the demand for variable inputs is inelastic and all own-price
elasticities are above minus one. The mean industry elasticities show that all variable
inputs are substitutes, but the cross-price elasticities between electricity and raw
materials are approximately zero.
The preferred cost function is shown in table 3.1. We use the same panel as was used
to estimate the cost-share equations in our earlier paper, but in this paper we do not
normalize the variables. Table 3.1 includes the industry average cost shares in 1972,
ai3972, rather than all the plant specific cost shares. The small sample adjusted x2-form
of the likelihood ratio test is applied in a general to specific search.'
In addition to the conclusions drawn from the estimated cost-share equations, the cost
function in table 3.1 implies increasing returns to scale with respect to variable inputs.
If variable inputs increase by one per cent, output increases by 1.3 per cent. 1° The
relationships. The adding up condition requires that E1u1ft=0.
9 X2(i) = -2(T-k 1 -1+j12)/T ilnLo
 - 1n1, 1 ], where T denotes the number of observations, k i
is the number of estimated coefficients in the general hypothesis, j is the number of restrictions,
and lnLo
 and InL i are the values of the log-likelihood function under the null and the general
hypothesis, respectively, cf. Mizon (1977).
10 This is somewhat above Klette (1994), who finds an elasticity of scale equal to 1.013 for
Metals using Norwegian plant level panel data. This aggregate industry includes ferro alloys and
other primary metals in addition to primary aluminium.
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elasticity of scale equals the inverse elasticity of costs with respect to output, which is
0.76.
Table 3.1. The estimated cost function
Coeffi-
cient
Estimate Coeffi-
cient
Estimate Restrictions from the cost-
share equations and industry
average cost shares in 1972
To, 3.454 (.624) llu -0.131	 (•108) ŒL,1972 0.220
102 5.225	 (-573 ) nu -0.606 (.090) ŒM,1972 0.598
703 4.176 (.906) TIL3 -0.280 (.154) ŒE,1972 0.182
'Y04 4.512	 (.682) r (.111) Oa, 0.050
105 5.087	 (.669) 'nu -0.422 (.099) km -0.050
706 4.842 (.646) T1L6 -0.390 (.132 ) ISLE 0
107 2.822 (.729) rh.47 -0.125	 (.175) f3
708 7.309 (2.16) 'nu -0.798 (.460) PmE -0.090
Tx 0.760 (.043) nm , 0.362	 (- 133) PEE 0.090
YXX 0 * 11M2 0.724 (.131) yisx 0
TIC *1) T1M3 0.455	 (.194) -ymx O
TICK 0 * 11M4 0.540 (.1001, TEx 0
15ac 0 * nms 0.716 (.127), 7Lic -0.178
YT 0.106 (.017) 11m6 0.618	 (.165) -NI( 0.178
Tn. 0 * nM7 0.142	 (.131), 'YEK 0
lix-r 0 * 11/448 1.378	 (.425), 'Yu O
TICT 0 * 'YMT O
YCAP 0 * TET O
illi, = -1492.73	 R2 = 0.993	 DW .--- 1.675
DF = 101	 SER = 0.072	 X2(8) = 9.902 (27%)
Standard errors in parentheses. lnL is the value of the log-likelihood function. DF
represents the degrees of freedom. The multiple correlation coefficient (R2), the standard
error (SER) and the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) are reported. The small sample-
adjusted x2(j)-statistic that tests the accepted cost function against the general is reported
(cf. Mizon (1977)), j denotes the number of restrictions, and the significance level where
the null hypothesis is rejected is given in parentheses.
1 ) Ye'hicin(QuiQmft), which implies that aincfttainKft .
* Restrictions supported by the likelihood ratio test at the five per cent significance
level.
Full scale production is most cost efficient according to our results, and may explain
why plants prefer to adjust sales by adjusting stocks rather than output." Output
variations may reflect necessary maintenance work on pot lines, and when market power
11 This is based on discussions with representatives from the industry.
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is present, that the profit maximizing strategy involves output reductions rather than just
stock adjustments. The market may react differently to stock and output adjustments,
because of the more
 temporary character of the first. Output reductions imply that output
is permanently "lost".
--
The hypothesis of constant returns to scale up to the capacity constraint; yx=1,
7xx-7-7>anKr=0, is clearly rejected by the likelihood ratio test. The test of this
hypothesis against the general model yields a x2 statistic equal to 13.550, and the null
(constant returns to scale) hypothesis is rejected at a significance level close to zero. 12
The hypothesis that the marginal cost curve is very steep close to the capacity constraint
is also rejected, and 'km is zero in the preferred cost function. This conclusion is robust
to alternative defmitions of a "high capacity utilization ratio", that is, to limits above or
below 0.97. Our data on capacity includes the additional capacity that can be obtained
from the upgrading of second grade aluminium in addition to own-smelting capacity.
Such upgrading was important for some plants during the late eighties, when the
utilization ratio of own-smelting capacity was very high in many plants. This possibility
suggests that at least some plants do not face an absolute short-run capacity constraint
equal to the smelting capacity, and may explain why a vertical segment of the marginal
cost curve is not found.
The cost function in table 3.1 includes two effects of investments in increased capacity
on variable costs: First, variable costs decrease due to a substitution of labour for raw
materials. This may be interpreted as a capital embodied technical change effect. And
second, variable costs increase because of complementarity between capital and variable
inputs. By restriction, the two effects cancel. When testing the restriction that the
elasticity of costs with respect to capacity is zero against the general cost function, we
get x2(1)=2.433. We must accept a 12 per cent probability of rejecting a true null
hypothesis to reject that a1nC1 /alnK1 =0, that is to reject the restriction IK = -VyicKlnKft
7>acin)(ft ïrrinTt Tucin(QuiQmft)]. The 12 per cent significance level is also
required to reject the zero capacity effect restriction on the preferred cost function.
There is a trade off between scale and capacity effects on variable costs in our data.
When estimating the general cost function with no restrictions on these effects, we find
the elasticity of costs with respect to output and capacity to be around 0.4 and 1.2
respectively. An increase in variable costs by 1.2 per cent when capacity increases by
one per cent and output remains constant is unreasonably high. Our output and capacity
12
 This implies that using average variable costs as a proxy for marginal cost, as in Klette
(1990), involves a measurement error.
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variables are strongly correlated, and we may face an identification problem with respect
to the output and capacity elasticities.
The preferred cost function includes a positive trend coefficient. One interpretation of
the positive trend effect is that an increase in processing and specialization have shifted
the average variable cost curve upwards over time. An alternative explanation is that the
trend coefficient reflects a misspecification problem because of our choice of functional
form or missing dynamics. The trend effect diminishes over time; while the annual trend
effect on variable costs is 2.2 per cent on average over 1974-1990, the effect is 0.6 per
cent in 1990. A zero restriction on the trend coefficient yr is clearly rejected, but we
still find support for increasing returns to scale with respect to variable inputs. The
coefficient yx increases from 0.76 to 0.87, however.
To be well behaved, the cost function must be non-decreasing and concave in prices of
variable inputs and non-increasing and convex in capital, cf. Brown and Christensen
(1981, p. 217-218). Lindquist (1993) concludes that most sample points support the
"concave in prices" condition. The own-price elasticity of electricity is positive in a
couple of years for plants 2 and 8, however, when the cost share of electricity is very
low. Plant 8 was closed down in 1981. The mean industry own-price elasticities are
negative in all years. The "non-decreasing in prices" condition is also satisfied in most
sample points. The main exception is plant 8. We also face a problem with the labour
cost elasticity of plant 2, which is around -0.05. The requirements with respect to capital
are satisfied in all sample points by restriction. Appendix 2 shows actual variable costs
and fitted variable costs obtained from the cost function in table 3.1. Our conclusion is
that the preferred cost function predicts the development of variable costs well.
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4.	 Price-cost margins and competition
The marginal cost that is implied by the accepted cost function are used with plant-
specific prices to calculate the price-cost margins: gft [pft - acftotaxft]Ipft. These
margins, which are presented in figure 4.1, are clearly not constant over time. One plant
exhibits periods with negative price-cost margins, which is not consistent with the
simple single-period profit maximization models discussed in section 2. However, a
plant that maximizes the discounted flow of expected profits under uncertainty and when
mistakes are costly should use discounted marginal cost rather than current marginal cost
as the decision variable, cf. Phlips (1980) and Blinder (1982). In this case, and when
long-term contracts are made, responses to current demand or cost shocks will be
somewhat sticky, and negative margins may prevail. Even with full certainty, negative
margins may well be part of an optimal strategy if regaining market shares involves
costs. In their annual reports, the Norwegian aluminium companies Hydro and Elkem
stress the importance of customer service to gain and keep market shares, which
suggests that regaining market shares does involve costs in this industry.
Figure 4.1. Plant specific price-cost margins
Table 4.1 gives the mean, maximum and minimum values, and the standard deviation,
of the price-cost margin of each plant. The margins are significantly above zero in most
sample points, the only exception is plant 6.'3 The industry margin is significantly
13 Average variable costs and prices are treated as deterministic variables when calculating
the standard error of the price-cost margins. The estimated marginal cost curves are used;
var(gft)=[Cft/(Xft -Pft)] 2 -var(yx), and the standard error is found by taking the square root of this
expression.
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above zero in all years. The simple competitive model with price equal to marginal cost
is rejected, as was expected because of increasing returns to scale.
Table 4.1. Price-cost margins (gd
Mean' Maxi-
mum l
Mini-
mum'
St.dev. Conel(r
,IPDT)2
Dickey-
Fuller test3
Plant 1 0.44 (.02) 0.56 (.01) 0.32 (.02) 0.06 0.20 -4.69 (s)
Plant 2 0.35 (.02) 0.50 (.02) 0.16 (.03) 0.10 0.30 -2.01
Plant 3 0.44 (.02) 0.54 (.01) 0.31 (.02) 0.07 0.12 -2.31
Plant 4 0.42 (.02) 0.57 (.01) 0.22 (.02) 0.09 0.13 -2.76
Plant 5 0.45 (.02) 0.58 (.01) 0.34 (.02) 0.07 0.52 -1.93
Plant 6 0.13 (.03) 0.54 (.01) -0.45 (.04) 0.27 0.32 -1.60
Plant 7 0.4 (.02) 0.57 (.01) 0.22 (.02) 0.09 -0.03 -5.73 (s)
Plant 8 0.27 (.02) 0.38 (.02) 0.19 (.03) 0.10 0.59 -2.39
Industry
average
0.38 (.02) 0.52 (.01) 0.19 (.02) 0.09 0.25 -4.79 (s)5
1) In parentheses: The standard error of the price-cost margin. The standard error of the
mean margin is the mean of the standard error in each sample point.
2) Correlation between detrended price-cost margins (e) and cycles in demand proxied
by the detrended industry production in OECD (IPDT). The trend effect, which is found
by regressing each variable on a linear trend variable, is subtracted from the variables.
3) (s) implies a significant Dickey-Fuller test at the five per cent significance level and
that non-stationary margins is rejected. The critical value of the Dickey-Fuller test is
-3.05 for plants 1-7 and -3.33 for plant 8.
4) The industry average is calculated as the weighted sum of the price-cost margins of
Norwegian plants. We use plant outputs as weights.
5) The panel data rather than the industry average data is used. The critical value is
-2.88.
The mean margin is above 0.4 for most plants. 14 The somewhat lower price-cost
margins of plants 2 and 8 are largely due to a cost disadvantage, that is a high marginal
cost due to a high average variable cost. These plants are relatively small. In addition,
plant 2 has obtained a low average price. The very low price-cost margin of plant 6,
which is one of the largest aluminium plants in our sample, is due to a low average
14 Using Norwegian plant level panel data over the period 1980-1990, Klette (1994) fmds
a price-cost margin equal to 0.1 for Metals. This aggregate industry includes ferro alloys and
other primary metals in addition to primary aluminium.
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price. 15 Plant 6's margin increased markedly during the late eighties as a result of an
increase in price.
In an attempt to reveal the importance of economies of scale, we compare price-cost
margins- based on marginal cost with price-cost margins based on average variable costs.
The industry margin defined over average variable costs equals 0.27, which is 29 per
cent below the industry margin based on marginal cost. Hence, economies of scale seem
to be a significant source of positive price-cost margins in this industry.
We now discuss three explanations to the cyclical behaviour of price-cost margins that
is illustrated in figure 4.1. First, equations (2.6) and (2.7) show that non-constant
margins may imply oligopolistic behaviour and reflect variation in the perceived
competitive reactions of other plants or entry and exit of competitors. Internationally,
industry concentration has declined, and one may expect price-cost margins to follow
a negative trend as new and possibly more efficient plants enter the market and put a
downward pressure on the price. Increased output by Norwegian plants have the opposite
effect on the margins because of the presence of economies of scale, however. Second,
price elasticities may depend on the deviation of demand from its trend path rather than
being constants. In this case we expect stationary fluctuations in the margins, cf.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, p. 75). If own-price elasticities decrease in periods
with expanding demand and increase in periods with contracting demand relative to the
trend path, price elasticities will be countercyclical and generate procyclical price-cost
margins. And third, procyclical price-cost margins may be due to rigidities in supply
because of capacity limits and the lumpiness of investments characteristic of this
industry. Stock adjustments and upgrading of second grade aluminium reduce this
rigidity, however.
Table 4.1 reports the correlation of detrended price-cost margins and the detrended
industrial production in OECD, which is assumed to reflect deviation in demand from
its trend path. With the exception of plant 7, support is found for a procyclical price-cost
margin. The industry margin is clearly procyclical, and the average value in peak and
'The mean price-cost margin based on average variable costs rather than estimated marginal
cost is -0.13 for plant 6. This suggests that vertical integration with a neighbouring rolling mill
in the same concern is important for this plant. Plant 6 delivers primary aluminium in liquid
form to the rolling mill. The price of liquid aluminium is below the price of aluminium in ingot,
but the negative price-average variable costs margin suggests that the price information for this
plant in the manufacturing statistics is misguiding. We assume that vertical integration does not
affect the input demand behaviour or cost structure of this plant, but an analysis of price
determination may be affected.
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trough periods are 0.39 and 0.35 respectively. 16 Because price-cost margins are found
to be significantly above zero in most sample points, cf. table 4.1, we conclude that
market power is present in both trough and peak periods.
Figure 4.2. Average price-cost margin of the Norwegian primary aluminium industry
and detrended industry production in OECD (IPDT)
If the variation in price-cost margins over time is primarily due to rigidities on the
supply side, unexpected demand or supply side shocks or cyclical price elasticities, we
expect the margins to be stationary and fluctuate around a constant level. The Dickey-
Fuller test (with a constant term) is applied to test the hypothesis that the price-cost
margins are integrated of order one, that is non-stationary, against the alternative
hypothesis that the margins are integrated of order zero, i.e. stationary, cf. Dickey and
Fuller (1979) and Engle and Yoo (1987). We use the formula in MacKinnon (1991) to
calculate the critical values consistent with our sample size. A significant Dickey-Fuller
test supports the hypothesis that the margins are stationary. The results from this test are
reported in the last column of table 4.1. At the five per cent significance level, non-
stationarity is rejected for two plants only. Figure 4.1 shows that there is a small
tendency to increasing margins over time for the other plants. Applying the Dickey-
Fuller test to the entire panel increases the power of the test, and in this case the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity is clearly rejected, however.
16 This is consistent with Domowitz et al. (1986), who find procyclical margins in
concentrated industries. Chirinko and Fazzari (1994), who analyse a panel of firm-level data,
conclude that "when market power varies temporally, it is usually procyclical". On the other
hand, analyses of US data at both the aggregate and relatively disaggregate industry level have
found countercyclical markups and hence also price-cost margins, cf. Bils (1987) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1991). This is true with respect to the Primary metals industry as well, as is
reported by Rotemberg et al.
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Since the price-cost margins seem to fluctuate around constant levels or a small positive
trend, we conclude that an increase in the degree of competition internationally due to
entry has not put a downward pressure on the mean margins of Norwegian plants. This
does not rule out that a negative pressure may be present in trough periods, if this is
offset by a higher margin in peak periods due to large demand shocks. Bresnahan and
Suslow (1989), who analyse the aluminium industry in North America, find that the
decline in concentration has affected the industry's pricing behaviour and reduced the
price-cost margin over the cyclical trough. They also conclude that oligopoly power is
nonessential to price determination in peak periods, because capacity constraints result
in right-angled marginal cost curves and imply that price is determined by the
intersection of the demand curve and the industry smelting capacity in peak periods.
We test the hypothesis that the decline in industry concentration internationally has put
a downward pressure on price and hence on price-cost margins in trough periods. As a
measure of concentration, we use the share of world smelting capacity accounted for by
the six historically large aluminium companies (CONS)." To discriminate between
trough (T) and peak (P) periods, we use the detrended measure of industrial production
in OECD. When this detrended activity measure is below its average, the period is
defmed as trough. The dummy variable DUMT equals one in trough periods and zero
elsewhere. Auxiliary regressions are run in which the panel of price-cost margins is
regressed on the concentration measure. TIME is a deterministic trend variable. The
whole panel of margins is used; g.(g i , g2,.., go, where gf is the vector of observations
of plant f. The 1972 and 1973 observations are included. DUMT, f=1,..,8, are plant
specific dummy variables. The standard errors are given in parentheses.
gt = 0.450 - 0.091 DUM2 - 0.436 DUM6 - 0.164 DUM 8 + 0.021 DUM6-TIMEt
(.015) (.027)	 (.057)	 (.037)	 (.005)
- 0.275 DUMTt - 0.170 DUM6•UMT t + 13.231 (l/CONS)-DUMT
(.105)	 (.055)	 (5.50)
According to this simple regression, the decline in industry concentration has a
significant positive effect on price-cost margins in trough periods. That is, we do not
find support for the conclusion in Bresnahan and Suslow (1989) that the decline in
industry concentration has put downward pressure on the price and hence on price-cost
margins in trough periods. Given their assumption of constant marginal cost up to the
capacity constraint, Bresnahan and Suslow use unit labour and material costs when
17 Data for 1971 and 1979 are from Bresnahan and Suslow (1989, p. 280), and data for 1980
and 1985-1990 are provided to us by Hydro Aluminium. Data for the remaining years are
calculated by assuming that this concentration measure follows a linear trend.
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calculating the industry price-cost margin, however. Our conclusion is robust to the
choice of cost measure, that is to whether we use average variable costs rather than the
estimated measure of marginal cost when calculating the price-cost margins. This
conclusion also goes through if we use detrended price-cost margins.
--
To discriminate between the differentiated products and the homogeneous goods case,
we test the hypothesis that Norwegian aluminium prices equal the spot market price in
the "long-run". Norwegian plants make extensive use of long-term contracts, which may
involve fixed prices or prices linked to those registered at the LME. This implies that
short-run price differences may well exist for physically identical aluminium products,
cf. the introductory section. Figure 4.3 shows the development in Norwegian prices and
the cash and 3-month price of primary aluminium registered at the London Metal
Exchange (LME). 18 All prices are measured in Norwegian kroner (NOK).
Figure 4.3 reveals important price variation both across Norwegian plants and between
Norwegian prices and the spot market prices. The cash and 3-month LME-price of 99.7
per cent primary aluminium ingot differ only marginally, after 1979. With the exception
of plant 6, Norwegian prices seem to vary around the LME-prices and to follow the
same trend.
Figure 4.3. The cash and 3-month price of primary aluminium registered at the London
Metal Exchange and the aluminium prices reported by Norwegian plants, NOK
18 The cash spot market price is taken from World Metal Statistics. Primary aluminium was
not traded at the LME before 1978, and the cash price is available on an annual basis from 1979.
The Canadian price of primary aluminium exported to the UK is used as a proxy of the world
market price before 1979. This price is reported by the International Monetary Found (IMF). The
3-month price was provided to us by Hydro Aluminium.
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Figure 4.3. continues
The "long-run price equalization" hypothesis is tested econometrically. For each
Norwegian price (Pf), we estimate an error-correction model that includes the 3-month
LME-price (PW), a constant term and a trend variable. Because the cash and 3-month
LME-price are very similar, we choose to concentrate on the latter. Since primary
aluminium was not traded at the LME before 1979, which may create an inconsistency
problem in the world market price before and after this year, we also include a dummy
variable in the general model. The dummy variable (DUM79), equals zero up to 1979
and one since. The general model includes two lags of the spot market price and one lag
of the own-price. The results are reported in table 4.2. Lower case letters indicate that
the variables are in
 logarithms,
 and Avt = log(Vt/Vt_ i ), that is the first difference of the
logarithm of a variable. The restrictions of long-run price homogeneity and price
equalization are tested. The F-form of the Lagrange multiplier test has been applied to
test for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals (AR(1)), cf. Kiviet (1986). To test for
cointegration between the variables in the long-mn relationship, we use the test
suggested in Kremers et al. (1992), that is based on the t-ratio of the error-correction
coefficient (tEcm). A significant test implies that the null hypothesis of no cointegration
is rejected. The critical values of the Dickey-Fuller test are used, cf. MacKinnon (1991).
We do not reject the hypothesis of long-run price homogeneity for any plant. A one per
cent increase in the LME-price yields a one per cent increase in Norwegian aluminium
prices in the long-run. In addition, we find support for long-mn price equalization for
plants 2, 4, 6 and 8. All Norwegian prices show significant short-mn discrepancies from
the LME-price, however. The first year effect on own-price of a one per cent increase
in the LME-price is around 0.5-0.6 per cent for most plants. The cumulative effect at
t+1, shown by the standardized interim multiplicator, is as much as 0.8-1.0 per cent for
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most plants, which implies rapid adjustment. These results suggest that much of the
observed price differences are due to long-term contracts with varying terms made by
Norwegian plants. Variation in quality, in addition to products tailor-made to fit
particular customers, customer service and reliability of delivery, may provide a basis
for a short-run and, for some plants, a permanent price above the LME-prices. Price
homogeneity is assumed to reflect that products are close substitutes, however. The
relatively slow adjustment for plant 6 may reflect a missing negative constant. If
included, the constant is not significant, however. The tEcm-test supports the hypothesis
of cointegration for all the long-run relationships reported in table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Testing the hypothesis that Norwegian prices of primary aluminium equals the
3-month LME-price in the long-mn. The left-hand side variable is Apft
Variable Plant
1
Plant
2
Plant
3
Plant
•4
Plant
5
Plant
6
Plant
7
Plant
8
APf,t-i 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
APwt 0.56 0.50 0.52 0.61 0.48 0.44 0.65 0.51
(0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
APwt-i 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
(Pf - Pw)t-i -0.48 -0.72 -0.73 -0.53 -0.63 -0.23 -0.71 -1.00*
(0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.09) (0.17)
Constant 0.04 0 * 0.06 0 * 0.06 0 * 0.05 0 *
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Trend 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
DUM79 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0* 0*
SIMt+i 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.78 0.54 1.11 1.02
SER 0.063 0.079 0.035 0.089 0.059 0.154 0.075 0.056
DW 1.18 1.48 1.64 1.47 1.62 1.85 1.90 1.37
AR(1) 1.82 1.33 0.25 1.51 0.80 0.04 0.35 2.80
tECM (s) (s) (s) (s) (s) (s) (s) (s)
Restr. p -0.69 0.09 -0.06 1.12 1.39 -0.73 -0.15 0.09
Restr. c -0.02 0.98 -1.13 0.23
The estimation period is 1974 to 1990, except for plant 8 for which the estimation ends
in 1981. Standard errors are in parentheses. SIM t+i is the cumulated interim multiplier at
t+1. The standard error of the regression (SER), the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW), and
the t-statistic that tests the restriction of long-nm price homogeneity (Rest. p) and a zero
constant term (Restr. c) are reported. The critical value of the tEcivrtest is -1.96 for plants
1,3,5 and 7, and -1.96 for plants 2,4 and 6, and -1.99 for plant 8. The tEactest for plant
8 is based on the freely estimated coefficient of (prpw)t_ i , which equals -1.05 (0.19).
* Restriction supported by the data. (s) Significant at the five per cent significance level.
When estimated freely, the coefficient of (pf-pw)t_ i equals -1.05 (0.19). The tEcm-
test is based on this.
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The estimated constant terms in table 4.2 imply that some Norwegian prices are as much
as 7-8 1/5 per cent above the 3-month LM:E-price. Hence, product differentiation seems
to be important for some plants. The relatively high price-cost margins of plants 1, 3,
5 and 7, are partly due to high prices.
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4. Final remarks
This paper measures the degree of market power in the Norwegian primary aluminium
industry from data on prices and estimated variable cost equations. The key findings are:
1. Norwegian aluminium plants charge a procyclical price-cost margin that is
significantly above zero in both trough and peak periods. The simple competitive
hypothesis is rejected.
2. The estimated variable cost function implies increasing returns to scale with
respect to variable inputs. Economies of scale are important for explaining the
observed margins.
3. The price-cost margins seem to fluctuate around constant levels or a small
positive trend, and the decline in industry concentration internationally has not
put a downward pressure on the margins.
4. The deviation of Norwegian aluminium prices from the spot market price can to
a large degree be explained by the use of long-term contracts made by
Norwegian plants. Price homogeneity is found, and a one per cent increase in the
spot market price increases Norwegian prices by one per cent in the long-run.
The hypothesis of differentiated products is not rejected, since several plants are
found to charge a price permanently over the spot market price. Price
homogeneity is assumed to reflect that the products are close substitutes, and for
a chosen product or quality, the price is determined by the spot market price and
a sustainable markup on the spot market price.
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Appendix 1.
The correspondence between the differentiated products model and the
homogeneous goods model.
The first-order profit maximizing condition of plant f, f=1,..,m, in the differentiated
products case is given in equation (A.1), which corresponds to equation (2.3).
(A.1) Pf {1 + (aPfiaXf).(Xf/Pf) + Ejo[(aPf/aXj)-(Xj/Pf) • (axi/aXf)(xfa)] }
= acfoiaxf
The variables are defmed in section 2. c = -(DPf/aXf)-(Xf/Pf) is the inverse own-price
elasticity of demand faced by plant f;
 p = -(apfiaxi)(xiipf) is the inverse cross-price
elasticity of demand between product f and j; 014 = (axiaxf)<xixi) is plant f's
conjectural variation elasticity with respect to plant j; f,j=1,..,m.
In the homogeneous goods case, all plants face the same demand curve and price: P 1
=..= Pf =. .=	 P and apiaxi apiax, apfrap* aP/aP*, apfram ap/am for
f,j=1,..m, where X = IfXf. We implement these restrictions in (A.1), which give
P {1 + opiaxxxlip) + Ii,fRapiaxxxi/p) (axioc)-ocfaim = acfcyaxf
P { 1 + (awax)(x/p)• [xfix - (1 + laxiocfm = acfomxf
In addition we have
1 + IJ,faXjtaxf = i + a(X xf)/axf = i + axiaxf - axoxf avaxf
P {
 i + (awax)-(Xp) (avaxfxxfix)} = acfcyaxf
or alternatively
(A.2) P [1 - e• 07] = acfoiaxf
where e = -(apiax)(x/p) is the inverse demand elasticity; eifi = (avaxf)(x.fix) is
plant f's conjectural variation elasticity with respect to total supply inclusive f's own
output. Equation (A.2) is identical to equation (2.5).
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Actual and fitted variable costs, 1972=1 to make the plants anonymous.
The preferred cost function in table 3.1 is used.
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